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Heidegger¶s interpretation of Nietzsche has been canonized in the 
philosophical tradition as an almost perfect demonstration of how the 
forgetfulness of Being continues the dominant positions of modern 
metaphysics. A close examination of available sources often corrobo-
rates the canonical view, which enables us to appreciate the general 
coherence of Heidegger¶s philosophy and to assess his merits as a 
Nietzsche critic. However, the role of reading in the interpretative 
process casts a different light on Heidegger¶s approach to Nietzsche 
and his relationship to the philosophical tradition. Particularly as em-
ployed in the late work of Paul de Man, reading is a technical term 
that refers to our mode of access to texts, but also to the capacity of 
criticism to open up non-totalizing interpretations of traditional 
works.1 This paper is concerned with three aspects of Heidegger¶s 
work, namely, (i) the role of Kant and Schopenhauer in Nietzsche¶s 
critique of metaphysics; (ii) Nietzsche¶s ³inversion´ of Platonism; and 
(iii) Heidegger¶s contribution to a hermeneutical reappraisal of Nie-
tzsche¶s thought. The importance of reading to all three aspects of 
Heidegger¶s approach to Nietzsche will perform a pivotal role in this 
discussion. 
It may seem ironic that Heidegger should begin rather early in his 
lectures on Nietzsche with a defense of Kant¶s aesthetic theory, rather 
than with a recapitulation of the ontological criticism that he devel-
oped in previous contexts. In a famous public debate with Ernst Cassi-
                                                 
1 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading. Figural Language in Rousseau, 
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rer, Heidegger repeatedly emphasized the role of intuition and the im-
agination to a proper understanding of Kant¶s philosophy.2 In opposi-
tion to the established tendency to interpret Kant either in narrowly 
scientific terms, or as a kind of modern Plato, Heidegger undertakes 
the difficult task of reassessing the ³metaphysical´ significance of the 
transcendental problematic. For Heidegger, however, metaphysics it-
self acquires an entirely new meaning through multiple interpretations 
of philosophical and literary works during the period of Sein und Zeit 
and extending into the years following its publication. Instead of func-
tioning in the traditional manner as a term that describes the attempt to 
privilege the intelligible over the sensible world, metaphysics is rede-
fined as the properly ontological concern of Dasein. 
While the issue of art does not emerge strongly in the Cassirer-
Heidegger debate, we can easily envision how the basic concerns of 
aesthetic experience might have figured in a more complete version of 
this encounter. In Heidegger¶s interpretation of Nietzsche, we soon 
discover that the doctrine of beauty as enunciated in Kant¶s aesthetics3 
is assigned a positive significance that has little to do with either its 
neo-Kantian appropriation or with the metaphysical misinterpretation 
that Nietzsche assigned to it. Heidegger clearly attributes Nietzsche¶s 
misinterpretation of Kant to the lingering influence of Schopenhauer, 
whose conception of the will no doubt stood in the way of a basically 
³classical´ view of the beautiful.4 From Heidegger¶s standpoint, Nie-
tzsche misinterprets Kant¶s definition of the beautiful as ³devoid of all 
interest´ in two ways: first, this phrase is taken out of context and 
misunderstood as the sole criterion for judging the beautiful; second, it 
                                                 
2 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by 
Richard Taft, Bloomington 1997. 
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. by J. H. Bernard, Amherst 
2000. 
4 See also Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 
Cambridge and New York 1990. 
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is falsely assumed to exclude all other relations to the aesthetic object. 
Heidegger argues, on the contrary, that Kant¶s criterion of disinterest-
edness actually frees the object to appear in a pure way. Rather than 
interpret disinterestedness as simply a limiting condition, Heidegger 
assimilates it to a mode of being that enables the object to appear as 
such: The word ³beautiful´ means appearing in the radiance of such 
coming to the fore.5 
It would have been impossible for Heidegger¶s early readers to 
miss the phenomenological resonance of this description of the beauti-
ful. Granted, his re-interpretation of ³disinterestedness´ may overlook 
the scientific character of Kant¶s aesthetic project, which harbors the 
modern bias in favor of subjectivity as a guiding principle. 
Heidegger¶s description of the beautiful does not allow us to assimi-
late Kant¶s achievement to the sweeping (and perhaps totalizing) 
characterization of modernity that assigns subjectivity a predominant-
ly negative significance. Thus, while the hermeneutics of Gadamer6 
represents a modified version of this interpretation, we are somewhat 
surprised to discover that Heidegger¶s defense of Kant against Nie-
tzsche also contains a ³hermeneutical´ core insofar as it reemphasizes 
the role of interpretation in the apprehension of an aesthetic appear-
ance which enables the ³things themselves´ to emerge in all their ra-
diant beauty. 
At the same time, Heidegger does not merely criticize Nietzsche as 
an interpreter of Kant but readily admits that matters of philosophical 
originality are sometimes quite distinct from matters of scholarship. 
Perhaps Nietzsche¶s misreading of Kant can be distinguished from the 
false interpretation that he adopts from Schopenhauer. As a hermeneu-
tical concept, the misreading of a text can constitute the basis for a 
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in: Nietzsche i, New York 1979, 110. 
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and 
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productive reading that opens up a new line of interpretation. 
Heidegger recognizes that Nietzsche¶s genealogical approach to intel-
lectual history is almost necessarily overdetermined insofar as it af-
firms the importance of physical life over traditional assumptions con-
cerning the origin of ideas. From the genealogical standpoint, both 
Kant and Schopenhauer follow Platonic directives7 in elevating nou-
menal over phenomenal relations on the basis of an underlying onto-
logical difference. From this standpoint, we might consider that Nie-
tzsche¶s misreading of Kant is what allows him to assert the 
importance of appearances over the metaphysical denial of an appar-
ent world. 
Heidegger locates Nietzsche¶s response to Kant¶s aesthetics in a 
critical genealogy that identifies rapture as ³form-engendering force´ 
in a revised notion of aesthetic experience. The significance of rapture 
cannot be grasped unless Kantian and post-Kantian conceptions of the 
aesthetic are held in view: ³Rapture as a state of being explodes the 
very subjectivity of the subject.´8 In turning from Kant, Nietzsche dis-
covers an alternative to metaphysics as the apotheosis of non-sensuous 
beings and begins to assign physical life a new meaning in a narrative 
that cannot be read in a purely idealistic manner. The death of the sub-
ject that his philosophy announces can be related to the attempt to re-
trieve a realm of being that has been denigrated since the origin of 
metaphysics. In calling attention to this movement away from the 
whole concept of the subject, Heidegger is able to suggest how Nie-
tzsche came to perform a crucial role in contemporary thought. 
And yet, while approaching the problem of aesthetics in an original 
manner, Nietzsche also risks transferring the dangers of subjectivity 
into the work of art itself. Heidegger suggests that, as a post-
Wagnerian, Nietzsche often fails to recognize the importance of the 
                                                 
7 Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. by Allan Bloom, New York 1991. 
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LQNietzsche i, 123. 
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artistic work as a relatively stable entity that can be approached apart 
from the subjectivity of the artist. Heidegger¶s remarkable essay, ³Der 
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,´ appears in its earliest versions as a series 
of lectures that were given at Freiburg and Zürich in 1935-36.9 
Heidegger¶s early lectures on Nietzsche were also presented during 
this same period and also reflect an interest in calling attention to the 
work-character of art, which functions to limit the subjectivism inher-
ent in modern aesthetics. Gadamer, of course, develops this aspect of 
Heidegger¶s philosophy in his criticisms of Kantian aesthetics and in 
his attempt to recover the ontological meaning of the work of art. Dur-
ing this phase of his research, however, Heidegger merely remarks 
that ³through the presentation of Nietzsche¶s aesthetics offered here it 
ought to have become clear by now how little he treats the work of 
art.´10 
Thus, Heidegger basically reads Nietzsche¶s approach to art 
through a thematic of instability that challenges received interpreta-
tions of the philosophical tradition. For example, in acknowledging 
that Nietzsche was always interested in clarifying the relationship be-
tween art and truth, Heidegger also contends that his concept of truth 
was never developed beyond the positions of Plato and Aristotle, 
which were later enshrined uncritically in the exemplars of early mod-
ern thought. From this standpoint, Nietzsche does not represent a sig-
nificant advance over the epistemology of Descartes. Hence, while de-
fining truth in terms of error, he refers his definition to a notion of 
certitude that lies at the heart of the Cartesian theory of knowledge. 
Nietzsche¶s divergence from the Cartesian tradition is therefore 
somewhat deceptive, since the view that truth is related to the role of 
error in the struggle for knowledge can be linked to a thematic of cer-
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titude that constitutes the model for interpreting the world in the first 
place. 
Moreover, Heidegger establishes the thematic of instability on a 
deeper level in identifying the ³fundamental experience´ that enabled 
Nietzsche to confront the problem of metaphysics in a new way. This 
experience is that of nihilism, which constitutes the gravest threat to 
the survival of metaphysics in its ³classical´ form. In Heidegger¶s ac-
count, this experience of nihilism is inseparable from the death of 
God, just as it constitutes an event (Ereignis) of overwhelming histor-
ical importance: ³The phrase µGod is dead¶ is not an atheistic procla-
mation: it is a formula for the fundamental experience of an event in 
Occidental history.´11 In genealogical terms, Nietzsche¶s pronounce-
ment implicates Christianity in the history of nihilism, which begins 
as metaphysics. The connection between Christianity and Platonism 
has been clearly established in numerous studies, but Nietzsche invites 
us to rethink this relationship, not on the level of historical influence, 
but in terms of shared patterns of denial that demonstrate mutual com-
plicity. 
Nietzsche¶s interpretation of Plato becomes crucial, therefore, 
within the context of historical genealogy, the new science that ulti-
mately enables him to interpret cultural phenomena in semiotic ways. 
On the basis of Nietzsche¶s criticism of traditional metaphysics, we 
might easily assume that he was unambiguous in his rejection of both 
Plato and Platonism. It is true that Nietzsche distinguishes Plato from 
Platonism largely due to issues of historical influence as opposed to 
authorial meaning. From this standpoint, Heidegger is sometimes as-
sumed to have argued that Nietzsche¶s philosophy constitutes an ³in-
version of Platonism´ that simply reverses what the classical philoso-
pher asserted to be true. However, Heidegger cannot be identified 
with this uncomplicated reading. If this were Heidegger¶s reading, 
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then he would not need to argue that Nietzsche conceived of the rela-
tionship between art and truth as one of discordance. And yet, 
Heidegger reminds us that Nietzsche¶s challenge to traditional meta-
physics seriously destabilizes this thought: ³He speaks of the discord-
ance that arouses dread, not in the period prior to his overturning Pla-
tonism, but precisely during the period in which the inversion is 
decided for him.´12 
Furthermore, Heidegger discovers signs of this discordance in the 
deep structure of Platonic metaphysics. In his analysis of Plato¶s Re-
public, Heidegger identifies the eidos that inspires the craftsman with 
an outward appearance of the thing to be produced, rather than with an 
abstract ³concept´ that allegedly underlies the phenomenon. At the 
same time, the eidos in no way depends on what the craftsman makes 
but is what enables him to ³frame´ his work according to what is pro-
scribed. Hence the craftsman allows things to become present as phe-
nomena, that is, as appearances that in some way correspond to ideas. 
However, the nature of this correspondence remains difficult to de-
termine. Since the craftsman does not produce the eidos, he is essen-
tially estranged from the being of the thing produced. From this per-
spective, the material thing can only detract from the original radiance 
of this idea. Heidegger attempts to explain why it is hard to translate 
the term that aptly describes this process: ³The Greek word amydron 
is difficult to translate: for one thing it means the darkening and dis-
torting of what comes to presence.´13 According to the implicit analo-
gy between art and craftsmanship, the element of ³darkening and dis-
torting´ inherent in all production establishes an irrevocable distance 
between art and truth. 
This does not mean, however, that Heidegger interprets Plato as 
providing the model for a basic discordance that Nietzsche simply ap-
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propriates in a new key. On the contrary, Plato¶s doctrine of beauty 
provides a crucial example of ³felicitous discordance,´ that is, tempo-
rary estrangement followed by the harmonious attainment of truth. 
Hence beauty and truth are distinguished but related as differently at-
tuned to an experience of radiance that posits Being in non-
discordance. Heidegger interprets Nietzsche¶s dreadful sense of dis-
cordance in relation to a resolution of discord that occurs in Plato and 
traditional Platonism. It is evident to Heidegger that Nietzsche inter-
prets Plato as functioning in terms of a clearly articulated form of 
metaphysical dualism. For this reason, Nietzsche cannot simply chal-
lenge traditional Platonism in a manner that leaves everything intact 
after basic structures have been displaced and perhaps dismantled. 
Hence, when referring to Nietzsche¶s attempt to ³overturn´ Plato-
nism, Heidegger does not contend that the process of overturning in-
volves the simple negation, let alone destruction, of an earlier posi-
tion. The confrontation with the ³true world´ does not install the 
³apparent world´ in its place. On the contrary, the apparent world also 
collapses when the true world ceases to be: ³Only then is Platonism 
overcome, which is to say, inverted in such a way that philosophical 
thinking twists free of it.´ The metaphor of ³twisting free´ is particu-
larly revealing in that it communicates both the act of breaking away 
and the incomplete nature of liberation. The two-fold significance of 
this expression prevents us from interpreting Nietzsche¶s refutation of 
Plato as either Enlightenment-style critique or as the perpetuation of 
the philosophical tradition in some new guise. 
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche does not arrive at a full under-
standing of his mature position until very late in his career. In 
Götzendämmerung, composed in 1888, Nietzsche presents a dense 
outline of how metaphysics came to an end through a narrative enti-
tled, ³How the µTrue World¶ Finally Became a Fable: The History of 
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an Error.´14 In this genealogical tale, Nietzsche produces an allegory 
of reading that specifies how Platonism is affirmed as true, appropri-
ated as Christianity, reduced to the status of ethics and finally denied 
in the style of scientific positivism, before it yields to the message of 
Zarathustra. Heidegger discusses this final, Nietzschean phase in 
terms of two related moments. During the first moment, the ³true 
world´ is abolished, but ³the vacant niche of the higher world re-
mains, and so does the blueprint of an µabove and below,¶ which is to 
say, so does Platonism.´15 For Heidegger, this first phase is best repre-
sented by Nietzsche¶s so-called middle period. However, Heidegger 
also maintains that Nietzsche moves beyond this ³positivist´ period in 
abolishing the apparent world as well. It is not possible to simply do 
away with the ³true world´ in a dualistic cosmology. Heidegger¶s 
conclusion is consistent with the tenor of his analysis: ³A new hierar-
chy and new valuation mean that the ordering structure must be 
changed.´16 
Heidegger relates the abolition of the true and apparent worlds to 
the emergence of an abyss that renews the meaning of metaphysics in 
Nietzsche¶s later work. This abyss is that of life, which is recognized 
as a contradictory phenomenon that integrates various perspectives in 
order to function as a coherent entity. The perspectives that enable life 
to flourish coordinate an encounter with appearances, which constitute 
the core of reality itself. ³Semblance´ is now assigned metaphysical 
significance to the degree that Nietzsche maintains ³that being-real is 
in itself perspectival, a bringing forth into appearances, a letting radi-
ate; that it is in itself a shining. Reality is radiance.´17 Heidegger 
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therefore makes definite claims about Nietzsche¶s status as a meta-
physician. Nietzsche is said to espouse a belief in life that ³overturns´ 
traditional metaphysics. Nonetheless, Heidegger continues to refer to 
Nietzsche as a metaphysician who reinterprets the question of being in 
terms of a revised notion of appearances. 
Is Heidegger justified in describing Nietzsche as a metaphysician? 
Nietzsche turns the history of metaphysics into an allegory, and then 
Heidegger reads Nietzsche as opposing the traditional idea that reality 
is stable and unchanging. Heidegger therefore provides an allegory of 
reading in reading Nietzsche as an allegorist who overturns the meta-
physical assumptions that generally govern our interpretation of reali-
ty. However, the category of the real is not thereby refuted but as-
signed a new meaning in a situation where even art comes to be 
interpreted as a language that ³expresses´ a reality that assumes the 
significance of will to power in an open economy of limitless trans-
formations. Reality, when interpreted as will to power, assumes the 
status of a ground that ultimately exceeds the totality of perspectives 
that are applied to it. On the other hand, in arguing in favor of Nie-
tzsche¶s renewal of metaphysics, Heidegger seems to place him in the 
paradoxically Kantian position of separating reality (as an extra-
linguistic and unknowable thing-in-itself) from the perspectives that 
enable us to experience the real as the product of human mediation. 
How can this inconsistent interpretation be acceptable? 
The way out of this apparent impasse has been perhaps most skill-
fully explored by Eric Blondel, whose work on Nietzsche has the 
hermeneutical value of deepening our reading of Heidegger.18 Blondel 
clearly indicates that Nietzsche both evokes the reality of a quasi-
physical ³text´ that functions negatively with regards to metaphysical 
illusions and also marshals various ³interpretations´ (as drawn from 
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various discourses of the human sciences) in order to detract from the 
objective character of his approach to the world. Hence the apparent 
rapprochement with Kant is actually quite different, since the distinc-
tion between text and interpretation prevents metaphysics from re-
emerging as either the apotheosis of a physical ³it-itself´ or as the 
substitution of interpretation for reality. This scheme, if properly un-
derstood, should prevent us from turning the will to power into the 
text that underlies every interpretation. 
Heidegger¶s work on Nietzsche continues to be important as a 
philosophical inquiry and scholarly resource. His reading is often ca-
pable of alerting us to the dangers of totalization that are inherent in 
Nietzsche¶s own thinking. In confronting the strengths and weakness-
es of his subject, he encourages us to place Nietzsche in an intellectual 
context that is appropriate to a major figure in the modern tradition. 
However, in overextending the metaphysical significance of Nie-
tzsche¶s philosophy, he ultimately risks collapsing the difference be-
tween text and interpretation upon which his own reading depends. It 
is in the hope that Heidegger¶s allegory of reading can be appreciated 
as a non-totalizing discourse that we return to his seminal contribution 
to the difficult task of interpreting Nietzsche. 
